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THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2026   |   SPECIAL REPORT & ANALYSIS

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Beijing Threatens Retaliation as U.S. Closes Door on Chinese Robots

FCC action makes humanoid robotics a new front in the technology trade war
 

Analysis  ·  July 30, 2026

Beijing warned it will take “resolute countermeasures” unless Washington reverses restrictions on foreign-made robots and power inverters, accusing the Trump administration of using national security to suppress Chinese companies and disrupt global supply chains. The Commerce Ministry did not specify what form the retaliation might take.

The U.S. action is more advanced than a proposal. On July 28, the Federal Communications Commission added foreign-produced “advanced robotic devices” — including humanoid and four-legged robots — to its Covered List. New models generally cannot receive the FCC authorization required for importation, marketing or sale in the U.S. unless the Department of War grants conditional approval.

Previously authorized models can continue to be imported and sold, and consumers can keep using devices they already own. The action also does not restrict federal-government purchases.

That means the policy is less an immediate removal of Chinese robots from the market than a barrier preventing the next generation of Chinese machines from entering it.

Table 1. Scope of the FCC’s July 28 Covered List action on foreign-made robots. Source: Federal Communications Commission.

Washington’s Security Case

The administration argues that network-connected robots combine the risks of a computer, surveillance device and mobile machine. Their cameras, microphones, sensors and mapping systems can collect information about homes, factories and critical infrastructure. A compromised robot could also be remotely manipulated, creating physical as well as cybersecurity risks.

The White House-led national security review concluded that foreign-made robots could be used to surveil Americans, support foreign intelligence operations or allow outside actors to commandeer the machines. It also warned that dependence on foreign production could create supply-chain vulnerabilities as robots become more widely used in manufacturing, warehouses, data centers and other sensitive facilities.

The decision technically applies to robots produced in any foreign country, not only China. But the conditional-approval system gives Washington considerable discretion to exempt products from allies or manufacturers that shift production and sensitive components into the U.S. In practice, the policy is structured broadly while being aimed primarily at China.

Industrial Policy Is Also at Work

The security concerns are real, but the commercial stakes are just as important. China is estimated to control roughly 85% of the emerging humanoid-robot market. Of approximately 15,000 humanoid robots shipped globally in 2025, China’s Unitree and AgiBot each shipped more than 5,000, while U.S. developers including Tesla and Figure AI shipped only a few hundred or fewer.

Figure 1. Estimated 2025 humanoid-robot shipments. China’s Unitree and AgiBot each shipped more than 5,000 of roughly 15,000 units worldwide; U.S. developers shipped a few hundred or fewer. Source: industry shipment estimates.

Keeping inexpensive Chinese robots out of the U.S. gives American developers more time to scale production without immediately facing the kind of price competition that transformed the solar-panel, battery and electric-vehicle markets. Companies including Tesla, Figure AI and Agility Robotics could benefit as customers are pushed toward U.S.-built systems.

There is a cost, however. American universities, startups and software developers have used lower-priced Chinese robots as research and development platforms. Nvidia, for example, recently demonstrated a humanoid reference design using a Unitree chassis. Restricting access to that hardware could raise development costs and slow U.S. experimentation even while protecting domestic manufacturers.

Retaliation May Initially Be Calibrated

China’s refusal to identify specific countermeasures is likely deliberate. Beijing can threaten escalation while preserving room to negotiate ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s expected visit to the U.S. in September. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng expressed “serious concern” over recent U.S. measures during a July 30 call with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, according to a Xinhua readout, though the two sides agreed to “enhance communication, build mutual trust and dispel doubt.” That suggests the robot restrictions will become part of the broader negotiating agenda rather than trigger an immediate rupture.

The dispute lands on an already strained truce. The Bessent/He channel — which has handled tariffs, rare earths and TikTok over the past year and a half — produced the fragile detente that enabled President Trump’s state visit to Beijing in May and suspended some tariffs and export curbs. But cracks have multiplied: fresh U.S. import duties as Trump rebuilds his tariff wall, disputes over rare-earth access, U.S. concern about potential Chinese weapons shipments to Tehran amid the U.S./Iran war, and alarm in Washington over Chinese open-weight AI models — with Bessent suggesting sanctions could target intellectual-property theft by Chinese AI firms. The robot restrictions add one more front.

The most likely initial response is targeted pressure rather than an immediate, economy-wide trade confrontation. Beijing could increase regulatory scrutiny of U.S. technology companies, restrict government procurement or use export licensing on components and materials important to advanced manufacturing. Those possibilities remain analytical scenarios; China has not announced its chosen response.

For U.S. agriculture, there is no immediate direct impact because neither the FCC action nor Beijing’s threat names farm products. The risk is spillover. Should the technology dispute derail wider trade talks, Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans and other commodities could again become bargaining leverage. For now, that is a secondary escalation risk rather than the base case.

Bottom line

The dispute is not primarily about today’s relatively small robot market. It is about who controls the hardware, manufacturing capacity and data infrastructure behind “physical AI.” Washington is trying to prevent Chinese producers from establishing an early U.S. foothold; Beijing views the move as an attempt to block one of its strongest emerging technology industries — and both sides now carry the issue into the run-up to September’s Trump/Xi summit.

AG POLICY & MARKETS DAILY   |   SPECIAL REPORT  |  U.S.-CHINA TECH — THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2026

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