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TUESDAY, AUGUST 25, 2026   |   SPECIAL REPORT & ANALYSIS

TRADE POLICY  |  CANADA COUNTER-TARIFFS

Canada Targets $20 Billion in U.S. Goods as Trade War Deepens

Sept. 8 duties pair 50% metals tariffs with $5.4 billion in aid — and Ottawa keeps potash, energy and a second wave of leverage in reserve. All dollar amounts are in U.S. currency.

Analysis  ·  August 25, 2026

Canada has converted its promise of dollar-for-dollar retaliation into a sweeping tariff and economic-support package, targeting approximately $19.9 billion of U.S. products while providing about $5.4 billion in assistance to Canadian workers and businesses.

Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne released a 99-page schedule covering hundreds of American products. The official list published by the Department of Finance runs to more than 800 entries — roughly 700 distinct products — with duties of 15%, 25% or 50% scheduled to take effect at 12:01 a.m. on Sept. 8, the day after Labor Day. The affected categories include steel and aluminum, dairy products, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper, plastics, machinery, seafood and electronics.

The measures match the value of the new 50% U.S. tariffs placed on approximately $19.9 billion of Canadian products beginning Aug. 22 after bilateral negotiations collapsed. Ottawa is emphasizing that the response is not merely dollar for dollar, but also “rate for rate,” applying the highest duties to many of the same industries Washington targeted. Champagne said the response was tailored to “match the American tariff on the same type of Canadian good.”

The package is also incremental rather than total. “Our existing counter-tariffs, including those on automobiles, will remain in place,” Champagne said — meaning the $19.9 billion announced this week sits on top of the roughly $40 billion of U.S. goods Canada has had under duty since March and April of 2025. The covered share of two-way trade is now materially larger than the headline number suggests.

Ottawa has matched Washington on value and on rate. What it cannot match is exposure: about 72% of Canadian goods exports go to the United States, while Canada absorbs roughly 16% of American exports.

How the Talks Collapsed

The retaliation followed the sudden failure of trade negotiations that both governments had suggested were close to a deal. The two capitals have since offered irreconcilable accounts of what went wrong, and the gap between them matters, because it shapes how quickly either side can climb down.

Prime Minister Mark Carney said he ended the talks late on Friday only after Washington introduced terms he called “unfair” and “uneconomic.” “We could not accept what the U.S. had offered, nor could we give what they asked,” Carney said. He added that it had become evident during negotiations that the administration intended to damage Canada’s auto sector and its steel and aluminum industries.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer rejected that account. Greer said Washington had “sought to accommodate the Canadians by … cutting tariffs in half on steel, on aluminum, and extensively reducing them on, on autos and even on things like, like softwood lumber.” His conclusion: “They simply wanted more.” The administration has separately justified the Aug. 22 tariffs by citing Canadian treatment of U.S. automobiles, wines and spirits, and dairy products.

Table 1. Two accounts of the same collapse. Source: Statements by Prime Minister Mark Carney, Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Aug. 22–25, 2026.

Carney framed the dispute in sovereignty terms rather than commercial ones. “An attitude at the negotiation table that Canada is a subsidiary of the United States, the Canadian industry is going to be disadvantaged relative to American industry … That’s not something we’re going to accept,” he said. Champagne was blunter: “We stand united in fighting for Canada. As the Prime Minister has said, we will support our workers, our businesses, and our industry with whatever it takes for as long as it takes.”

The rhetorical temperature has risen accordingly. President Trump called Canada “easily the most difficult and unreasonable” country he deals with, told Canadian leaders to “fall in line” or face consequences “far WORSE,” and on Tuesday threatened to rename Lake Ontario “Lake America.” Ontario Premier Doug Ford, who ran the 2025 World Series advertisement featuring Ronald Reagan criticizing tariffs — the ad that prompted Trump to terminate an earlier round of talks — called the president the “king of bankruptcies.” This is not the vocabulary of a negotiation that resumes next week.

Figure 1. Eighteen months of escalation. Source: Ag Policy & Markets Daily compilation from U.S. and Canadian government announcements, March 2025 through August 2026.

Metals Are the Centerpiece

The largest component of the Canadian retaliation is the decision to increase tariffs on U.S. steel, aluminum and many metal-derived products to 50% from 25%.

That serves several purposes. It directly matches the U.S. metals rate, protects Canadian producers from U.S. competition and discourages metal originally destined for the American market from being redirected into Canada. It also sends a stronger political message than a uniform 15% or 25% response would have.

Other 50% tariffs will apply to furniture and to clothing and apparel. 

Cheese, dairy, home appliances and fish and seafood will generally face 25% duties, while a 15% rate applies to a residual category that includes rubber molds, machinery parts, selected electronics and tools. Machinery and mechanical equipment, paper and paperboard, electrical machinery and seafood account for some of the largest categories after metals.

The breadth of the list means the effects will extend well beyond heavy industry. Motorcycles, washers and dryers, dishwashers, refrigerators, chain saws, furniture, lighting products, golf equipment, video-game consoles, processed cheese, clams and frozen octopus are all included.

That visibility is deliberate. Tariffs on industrial inputs pressure manufacturers, but tariffs on recognizable consumer goods make the trade conflict more tangible to households and encourage retailers to promote Canadian or non-U.S. alternatives. A chain saw and a box of processed cheese slices do more political work than a tariff line for cold-rolled coil.

Table 2. Canada’s Sept. 8 counter-tariff schedule. Source: Department of Finance Canada, list of products from the United States subject to counter-tariffs effective Sept. 8, 2026.

The Political Geography of the Target List

Canadian officials describe the list as a defense of domestic market share. 

Trade analysts see a second design criterion: several of the targeted product groups are concentrated in Republican-held congressional districts, particularly in appliance, machinery and metal-fabricating regions of the Midwest and the South.

The underlying geography favors Ottawa more than the aggregate trade numbers do. Canada is the leading export market for 36 U.S. states. North Dakota sends 82% of its $8.8 billion in exports north. Michigan, Maine and West Virginia each send roughly half of their exports to Canada. Ohio alone ships $21.8 billion a year across the border, much of it in exactly the machinery and appliance categories now facing 25% and 50% duties.

Figure 2. Where the retaliation lands. Source: Progressive Policy Institute analysis of U.S. Census Bureau state export data; Ag Policy & Markets Daily.

This is the asymmetry that partially offsets Canada’s macroeconomic disadvantage. Canada cannot inflict proportional damage on the U.S. economy, but it can inflict concentrated, locally legible damage in states whose delegations have influence over trade policy. Whether that translates into political pressure in Washington is the wager embedded in the entire package.

Protection for Some Firms, Higher Costs for Others

Canadian officials said the list was designed partly to reduce competition from U.S. companies for Canadian businesses that are being disadvantaged by Washington’s tariffs. That makes the package more than conventional retaliation; it is also a form of temporary industrial protection.

A Canadian appliance, furniture, steel or paper producer facing weaker U.S. sales could gain market share at home as competing U.S. products become more expensive.

But the same tariffs can hurt Canadian companies that rely on American machinery, components, metals or specialized equipment. A 25% or 50% tariff becomes a direct increase in production costs when a suitable Canadian substitute is unavailable.

Ottawa therefore will continue accepting requests for tariff remissions. Canada’s official tariff policy says relief may be granted when duties create unintended harm, including through waived tariffs or refunds. The remission process will be critical in determining whether the measures primarily hurt U.S. suppliers or instead become an additional tax on Canadian manufacturers.

There is an unavoidable tension: the more exemptions Ottawa grants, the less pressure the tariffs place on U.S. exporters. But the fewer exemptions it grants, the more likely Canadian manufacturers are to suffer collateral damage.

A $5.4 Billion Package That Is Mostly Credit

Ottawa’s accompanying $5.4 billion support package — C$7.5 billion — is intended to keep tariff-exposed companies operating while helping workers remain employed or retrain. The package combines new funding, expansions of existing programs and easier access to government-backed credit.

Approximately $2.5 billion is allocated to worker support through Rapid Response Supports for Workers and Employers, including extensions of temporary Employment Insurance provisions and a workforce retention and retraining program built around work sharing. The aim is to reduce permanent layoffs by allowing companies to cut hours temporarily while workers receive income support and training.

Another $1.1 billion will go through Canada’s regional development agencies under a Regional Tariff Response Initiative to provide liquidity and other assistance to affected businesses.

The Business Development Bank of Canada will receive a new $361 million lending stream for small and medium-sized companies facing immediate cash-flow pressures. Eligible loans will range from roughly $181,000 to $3.6 million, with borrowers required to pay only interest during the first 36 months. The minimum revenue threshold for BDC borrowers has been lowered to about $720,000, widening the eligible pool.

For larger and longer-term investments, Ottawa is creating a $1.4 billion Canada Strong Diversification Fund within its Strategic Response Fund. It will support projects that are ready to move quickly and that can expand domestic production or reduce dependence on the U.S. market.

The government also is making its existing $7.2 billion Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility more flexible for major employers. That facility is not additional spending on top of the $5.4 billion package; it is an existing source of financing being adjusted to accommodate the latest tariff shock.

Figure 3. The composition of the support package. Source: Department of Finance Canada; converted to U.S. dollars at C$1 = US$0.72.

That distinction matters. Much of the package consists of loans and liquidity support rather than grants. It can prevent otherwise viable businesses from failing because of a temporary cash-flow shortage, but it cannot fully compensate a company for the permanent loss of its largest export market.

The interest-only period on smaller-business loans similarly provides breathing room rather than debt forgiveness. Principal eventually must be repaid — and the 36-month window means the first repayment cliff arrives in late 2029, well beyond the scheduled 2026 review of the USMCA. Firms are being asked to borrow against a trade relationship whose terms nobody can currently forecast.

Tariff Coverage Is Not Tariff Revenue

The approximately $19.9 billion figure represents the annual value of goods covered by the Canadian tariffs — not the revenue Ottawa expects to collect. Measured against the $333.6 billion of U.S. goods exports to Canada in 2025, the newly covered trade is roughly 6% to 7% of the total.

Actual tariff revenue will be much lower. Importers will cancel orders, change suppliers, apply for remissions or shift production. Trade volumes also are likely to decline as the duties take effect. A tariff that works as a deterrent collects little; a tariff that collects a great deal has failed to change behaviour.

Canadian officials said they do not expect tariff collections to exceed the cost of the $5.4 billion support package. That means the government is not treating the counter-tariffs as a fiscal windfall. The response will likely impose a net cost on Ottawa, particularly if the trade conflict lasts for several years.

The support package is therefore best viewed as a bridge: it buys businesses time to find new customers, substitute inputs or reorganize production. Whether that bridge leads to lasting diversification is less certain. Canada has announced diversification strategies after every trade shock since the 1980s, and the U.S. share of its exports has moved very little.

Agriculture Faces a Two-Sided Risk

Agriculture and food are woven through the retaliation, particularly through tariffs on dairy products, seafood and agricultural machinery.

U.S. manufacturers of farm equipment could lose Canadian sales as the tariffs increase prices for tractors, combines, engines, implements and other machinery. 

But Canadian farmers also could face higher capital and repair costs when comparable domestically produced equipment or parts are unavailable — and in most categories of high-horsepower equipment, they are not available.

Remissions will be especially important for specialized parts needed during planting, harvest or livestock operations. A tariff that delays access to a critical part can cause more economic damage than the dollar value of the duty itself. A combine idled for ten days in September costs a producer far more than a 25% duty on a gearbox.

U.S. dairy and seafood exporters also could lose market share, benefiting Canadian producers or suppliers from other countries. Consumers, however, could pay more where alternative supplies are limited. The United States exports more than $30 billion in agricultural products to Canada annually — bakery goods, cereals and pasta, fresh fruit and vegetables, and ethanol — which makes agriculture one of the few sectors where Washington runs a consistent surplus with its northern neighbour and one of the few places Ottawa can impose loss without immediately raising its own industrial costs.

A More Strategic Form of Retaliation

The combination of tariffs, business financing, worker support and investment funds shows that Canada is preparing for more than a brief negotiating dispute.

The tariff list seeks to punish U.S. exporters and shelter Canadian producers. The loan programs are designed to prevent immediate failures. The diversification fund is intended to restructure production and trade over a longer period. That is a more strategic response than simply imposing duties and waiting for Washington to negotiate.

The political language also has shifted. Champagne said Canada acted because the U.S. “asked too much and offered too little.” Carney has described the dispute as an economic attack, while Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre has urged Canadians to buy domestically produced goods and called for Parliament to return early to debate additional economic measures.

The emergence of broad political support for retaliation could make it more difficult for Ottawa to remove the tariffs without receiving a meaningful U.S. concession. When the government benches and the opposition benches agree, a climbdown stops being a policy adjustment and becomes a political defeat.

Economic Parity Is Harder Than Tariff Parity

Canada can match the U.S. dollar for dollar and rate for rate, but it cannot produce economic symmetry.

The Canadian economy depends much more heavily on the U.S. market than the U.S. economy depends on Canada. About 72% of Canadian goods exports go to the United States, and those shipments are equivalent to roughly 17% of Canadian GDP. American exports to Canada, though large in absolute terms at $333.6 billion in 2025, amount to about 1% of U.S. GDP. Washington has far greater capacity to absorb a prolonged dispute.

Figure 4. The dependence gap. Source: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; Statistics Canada; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2025 goods-trade data.

Canada’s best strategy is therefore to concentrate pain on politically or economically sensitive U.S. sectors while protecting its own critical supply chains through exemptions and support programs.

That explains the focus on metals, machinery, food products and visible consumer goods rather than an immediate move against energy or potash. Ottawa is escalating, but it is not yet using the measures most likely to produce widespread North American disruption.

Washington Says It Does Not Need Canada

President Trump has repeatedly argued that the United States does not need Canada. On most goods, that claim is defensible: American manufacturers can find alternative suppliers for furniture, apparel or cheese, and the adjustment would be an inconvenience rather than a crisis. 

On energy, the claim does not survive contact with the data. In 2025 Canada supplied 63.4% of all crude oil imported by the United States — about 3.9 million barrels a day — close to 100% of imported natural gas at 8.6 billion cubic feet a day, and 81.3% of imported electricity. Canada is also a leading supplier of uranium to U.S. reactors. Together these flows are worth roughly $115 billion a year and account for about 20% of everything Canada sells abroad.

Figure 5. The energy relationship the tariffs have not touched. Source: Canada Energy Regulator, 2025 Canada-U.S. energy trade snapshot; Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, “Canadian Oil Important for Midwest Gasoline Prices.”

The confusion arises because the United States is a net petroleum exporter. It is — in aggregate. But aggregate barrels are not interchangeable barrels. American shale produces light sweet crude. Much of the U.S. refining fleet, particularly in the Midwest and on the Gulf Coast, was built decades ago to process heavy sour crude, and that equipment cannot simply be pointed at domestic light oil.

The Midwest is the clearest case. Refineries in PADD 2 run about 2.8 million barrels a day of Canadian crude, which is roughly 73% of their total crude inputs, and more than 70% of all U.S. imports of Canadian crude are processed there. Reconfiguring those plants to run light sweet oil would require years and billions of dollars of capital, and it would strand the coking and desulfurization units that make them profitable. Geography reinforces the chemistry: Canadian crude arrives by pipeline into the interior, where seaborne alternatives from Latin America or the Middle East cannot easily reach.

The United States does not import Canadian oil because it lacks oil. It imports Canadian oil because its refineries were built to run the kind of oil Canada produces, and because the pipelines already point south.

The same logic applies to natural gas and electricity. Gas moves through fixed pipeline systems into the U.S. Midwest, Pacific Northwest and Northeast; hydroelectric power from Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba feeds New England, New York and the upper Midwest, particularly during winter peaks. These are not commodity markets in which a buyer can switch vendors. They are physical systems with one supplier at the other end of the wire or the pipe.

This is precisely why energy has been excluded from every Canadian retaliation list, including this one. The leverage is real, which is what makes it dangerous. A Canadian export tax on crude would raise Midwest gasoline and diesel prices within weeks — and would fall on Alberta and Saskatchewan producers who have no alternative outlet for landlocked heavy barrels. Both governments understand that the energy relationship is the one part of the arrangement that neither side can quickly replace, which is also why neither has been willing to test it.

The Escalation Ladder Ottawa Has Not Climbed

What Canada has withheld is more consequential than what it has deployed. The Sept. 8 package leaves untouched the levers that would convert a costly trade dispute into a continental supply shock.

Potash is the sharpest instrument aimed at U.S. agriculture. Canada accounts for about a third of world potash production, and the United States imported 12.1 million tonnes of Canadian potassium chloride in 2024, with no adequate alternative supplier outside Russia and Belarus. A Canadian potash measure would raise U.S. fertilizer costs into the 2027 planting season. It is also the lever most likely to draw a disproportionate American response.

Table 3. Canada’s escalation ladder: deployed and held in reserve. Source: Ag Policy & Markets Daily analysis; Canada Energy Regulator; Library of Parliament; Department of Finance Canada.

The ladder cuts both ways. Every rung Ottawa has left unclimbed is also a rung that would hurt a Canadian province before it hurt a U.S. state — which is precisely why the reserve levers remain in reserve.

Do Counter-Tariffs Actually Work

The case against Canada’s approach is not that it is too weak. It is that counter-tariffs are the wrong instrument entirely.

Karl Schamotta, chief market strategist at the global-payments firm Corpay, argued that the retaliation may backfire. “An intensified trade war will hurt the country more than the U.S.,” he said. “Countertariffs will not help. In Canada, just as in the U.S., they are effectively taxes on domestic consumption. They raise the cost of living while doing little to shift trade balances or improve overall economic welfare.”

The economics of that critique are hard to dispute. A tariff is collected at the Canadian border from a Canadian importer, and most of it is passed to Canadian buyers. The Bank of Canada will read the Sept. 8 measures as a supply shock that raises prices and lowers output simultaneously — the least convenient combination for a central bank already managing tariff-driven weakness in manufacturing employment.

The counterargument is political rather than economic. A government that absorbs a 50% tariff without responding invites further demands, and Canadian officials have concluded that the cost of appearing to concede exceeds the deadweight loss of the duties. The support package exists precisely to underwrite that judgment: it is the price of making an economically costly choice politically sustainable.

Would an Extended Trade War Boost Inflation

Yes — but the more useful answer distinguishes between a one-time increase in the price level and sustained inflation, and between the Canadian and American sides of the border.

A tariff raises the price of affected goods once. If the rate then holds steady, the measured inflation rate returns to its prior path after roughly a year, because the higher price becomes the new base. What makes a trade war genuinely inflationary is repetition: each new round of duties delivers a fresh impulse before the previous one has washed out of the annual comparison, and firms that expect further rounds begin pricing pre-emptively.

Canada has already run this experiment. Bank of Canada research on the counter-tariffs imposed in March 2025 found that affected goods rose about 6% relative to comparable untariffed products by mid-June — a pass-through of roughly a quarter of the 25% duty — and added approximately 0.3 percentage points to consumer price inflation. When most of those counter-tariffs were removed on Sept. 1, 2025, grocery and appliance prices reversed almost completely within three months.

Two details from that episode matter now. First, pass-through was partial and gradual, not immediate and complete, which means the Sept. 8 measures will show up in Canadian CPI over the fourth quarter rather than in September. Second, products explicitly labelled as tariffed rose faster than identically tariffed goods that were not labelled — salience itself moved prices. A more prominent, more political tariff round may therefore pass through faster than the 2025 precedent implies.

Scaling that precedent to the current package suggests a Canadian price impulse somewhat larger than last year’s. The rates are higher — 50% rather than 25% on the biggest categories — and the coverage is broader at more than 800 tariff lines. Applying the observed one-quarter pass-through to a 50% duty implies roughly a 12% increase on directly affected goods, concentrated in appliances, furniture, apparel and processed foods. A weaker Canadian dollar would compound it.

The U.S. inflation effect from this round is smaller. Tariffs on $19.9 billion of Canadian goods are a rounding error against total U.S. goods imports, and the affected products — hockey sticks, wine, cement, cosmetics, jewelry, furniture — carry modest weight in the consumer basket. The American exposure is not the current list. It is the three categories that would follow if the dispute widens.

Table 4. How an extended trade war would reach consumer prices. Source: Ag Policy & Markets Daily analysis; Bank of Canada Staff research on retaliatory tariffs; Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; Canada Energy Regulator.

Central banks face the least convenient version of this problem. A tariff shock raises prices and lowers output at the same time, so neither tightening nor easing addresses both halves. The Bank of Canada’s July projection already embedded a peak of about 0.4 percentage points on headline inflation in the first quarter of 2027 from elevated transportation and supply-chain costs — before the September measures were announced. Ottawa’s own counter-tariffs now add to the number the Bank must look through.

The honest summary: this round is a price-level event, mostly borne by Canadians. It becomes an inflation event if it reaches automobiles in January, and a food-price event only if potash or energy is ever put on the table.

USMCA Uncertainty Adds to the Damage

The dispute also raises a larger question about the reliability of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. The new U.S. tariffs apply to the targeted Canadian goods even when those products otherwise meet USMCA rules.

That weakens one of the agreement’s central promises: that companies complying with its sourcing and content requirements can count on predictable tariff treatment. Until Aug. 22, roughly 85% to 95% of Canada/U.S. trade still crossed duty-free precisely because of that carve-out. Its erosion, rather than the $19.9 billion headline, is the structural news in this round.

The resulting uncertainty could become more damaging than the first round of tariffs. Companies can calculate the cost of a known duty. It is much harder to justify a new factory, processing plant or cross-border supply arrangement when tariff treatment can be changed through unilateral action.

The next major pressure point is the separate U.S. plan to raise tariffs on Canadian cars, trucks and automotive parts to 50% beginning Jan. 1, 2027, a measure the president has threatened to pair with a second wave of 50% metals duties. The automotive sector is far more integrated than most of the industries included in the current $19.9 billion package, with components frequently crossing the border several times during production. A 50% vehicle and parts tariff would compound at each crossing and could therefore cause substantially greater economic disruption than everything announced to date.

Outlook: Controlled Escalation for Now

The most likely immediate consequences are a rush of remission applications, accelerated imports before Sept. 8, reduced orders from U.S. suppliers and efforts by Canadian companies to identify domestic or overseas substitutes. Expect a visible August surge in cross-border shipments of appliances, machinery and steel, followed by an unusually weak September.

The initial tariff package is aggressive but still controlled. Ottawa is matching the U.S. action while avoiding energy, potash and other measures that could quickly spread the damage across the continental economy.

The danger is that retaliatory tariffs develop their own momentum. Companies make new sourcing arrangements, governments create additional support programs and political leaders become invested in demonstrating resolve. Each step makes it harder to return to the previous trading relationship.

Canada’s $5.4 billion support package can make the confrontation more economically and politically sustainable, but it cannot eliminate the underlying asymmetry in the relationship.

Bottom line

Canada matched Washington on value and on rate, but the more important decisions were the ones Ottawa did not make. Energy, potash and export restrictions stay in reserve, which means this round is still a bounded trade dispute rather than a continental supply shock.

Watch the remission docket, not the tariff schedule. The share of applications Ottawa grants over the next 90 days will reveal whether the counter-tariffs function as pressure on U.S. exporters or as a tax on Canadian manufacturers — and Canadian officials have already conceded that collections will not cover the $5.4 billion in support.

The claim that the United States does not need Canada holds for furniture and cheese. It does not hold for energy. Canada supplies 63.4% of imported U.S. crude, close to all imported natural gas and 81.3% of imported electricity, and Midwest refineries run a crude slate that domestic light shale oil cannot replace without years of capital spending. That dependence is the reason energy stays off both countries’ target lists.

On inflation: expect a Canadian price-level increase of roughly 12% on directly affected goods, phased in over the fourth quarter, based on the one-quarter pass-through the Bank of Canada measured in 2025. The U.S. effect stays small unless the dispute reaches automobiles on Jan. 1 — which would be an inflation event, not merely a price-level one.

For U.S. agriculture, the exposure is concentrated in farm machinery, dairy and processed foods, and in the 36 states for which Canada is the top export market. The asymmetry that protects the U.S. macro economy offers no protection at all to a combine dealer in North Dakota or an appliance plant in Ohio.

The decisive question is not whether the first-round tariffs match dollar for dollar. It is whether Washington and Ottawa can keep the dispute out of automobiles on Jan. 1, and away from energy, fertilizer and the core supply chains that have made North America a single production platform.

AG POLICY & MARKETS DAILY   |   TRADE POLICY  |  CANADA COUNTER-TARIFFS — TUESDAY, AUGUST 25, 2026