POLICY • NEWS • MARKETS
AG POLICY & MARKETS DAILY
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2026 | SPECIAL REPORT & ANALYSIS
SPECIAL REPORT | U.S./CHINA TRADE
Xi Visit Could Turn China’s Farm Pledges Into Real Demand
Ending the 10% levies is the key to restoring U.S. competitiveness.
Analysis · September 5, 2026
The most important agricultural outcome from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s planned Washington visit will not be another purchase pledge. It will be whether the United States and China remove the remaining 10% tariffs they imposed on each other — especially China’s additional 10% duty on U.S. farm products.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said Thursday that the two countries expect to announce agricultural and non-tariff-barrier measures during Xi’s visit. Greer emphasized that the administration is not seeking a comprehensive trade agreement but a framework for managing the relationship and “incentivizing American sales into China.”
The statement points toward implementation of the preliminary agricultural framework reached during President Donald Trump’s May visit to Beijing. China committed to buying at least $17 billion annually in U.S. agricultural products during 2026, 2027 and 2028 (prorated for 2026), excluding its separate commitment to purchase 25 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans annually. The two sides also agreed in principle to reciprocal tariff reductions and creation of a U.S./China Board of Trade that would identify roughly $30 billion of goods for lower tariffs.
But Beijing has not yet made the large-scale non-soybean purchases needed to satisfy the $17 billion commitment. China bought no U.S. corn during the first seven months of 2026, although it imported 2.98 million metric tons of U.S. sorghum — nearly four times its total for all of 2025. Traders continue to wait for tariff reductions before treating China’s purchase promises as commercially executable rather than government-directed commitments.
| Element of the May framework | Commitment | Status heading into the Xi visit |
| Soybean purchases | 25 million metric tons annually | Separate from the $17 billion pledge; purchases to date have leaned on state-owned buyers |
| Other U.S. farm products | At least $17 billion annually, 2026–2028 (prorated for 2026) | Large-scale non-soybean buying has not yet materialized |
| U.S. corn | Covered under the $17 billion pledge | No U.S. corn purchased in the first seven months of 2026 |
| U.S. sorghum | Covered under the $17 billion pledge | 2.98 million metric tons imported, Jan.–July 2026—nearly four times all of 2025 |
| Reciprocal tariff reductions | Agreed in principle | Both sides still apply 10% tariffs; U.S. reciprocal tariff runs through Nov. 10 |
| U.S./China Board of Trade | Identify roughly $30 billion of goods for lower tariffs | Not yet operational; agriculture’s inclusion undecided |
| Port-fee suspension | Reciprocal port fees suspended one year from Nov. 10, 2025 | Expires Nov. 10, 2026—same day as the U.S. reciprocal tariff; no extension announced |
Table 1. China’s May 2026 agricultural commitments and where they stand. Sources: USTR; Reuters; U.S. trade data.
The 10% Tariff Is the Decisive Issue
China’s remaining 10% additional tariff places U.S. farm products at a major disadvantage to supplies from Brazil and other origins. That is particularly important for soybeans, where Chinese crushers routinely compare the landed cost of U.S. and Brazilian beans by only a few dollars per metric ton.
As an illustration, a 10% tariff on soybeans valued at $500 per metric ton adds approximately $50 per metric ton — or roughly $1.36 per bushel — to the Chinese buyer’s cost. That penalty can erase a seasonal U.S. price advantage and allow Brazilian soybeans to remain competitive even when their underlying export price is substantially higher.
Figure 1. What China’s 10% duty adds to the cost of U.S. soybeans (illustration at $500 per metric ton). Source: Author calculations.
Removing the tariff would place U.S. soybeans much closer to equal footing with Brazil during the U.S. harvest and winter export season. It also could bring private Chinese crushers back into the U.S. market. Purchases under the existing arrangement have relied heavily on state-owned firms because private buyers have little incentive to absorb the tariff merely to help Beijing meet a government commitment.
Brazil would remain a formidable competitor because of its expanding production, strong Chinese commercial relationships and increasingly efficient northern export routes. But tariff parity would again allow seasonal price differences, protein content, freight and availability — rather than Chinese trade policy — to determine the origin of purchases.
The U.S. side currently maintains a 10% reciprocal tariff on Chinese imports, scheduled under the existing framework to remain in effect through Nov. 10. China’s removal of its corresponding duty is the action that would directly improve U.S. agricultural competitiveness, but Beijing likely will demand matching U.S. action. A mutual removal would therefore be both an agricultural concession and a broader signal that the two sides are moving from a temporary truce toward a more durable trade framework.
A narrower outcome is also possible: agriculture could be included in the planned $30 billion tariff-reduction basket without either country eliminating the entire 10% tariff regime. The details would then matter enormously. Permanent, product-wide tariff removal would be far more valuable than temporary exclusions issued to selected importers or state-owned companies.
| Possible summit outcome | What it would mean for U.S. farm exports |
| Mutual, permanent removal of both 10% tariffs | Restores price parity with Brazil; private Chinese crushers can return; broadest and most durable gain |
| Agriculture included in the $30 billion tariff-reduction basket | Partial relief; value depends on whether cuts are product-wide and permanent or limited to selected importers |
| Temporary exclusions for selected importers or state-owned companies | Keeps purchases dependent on state-directed buying; little change for ordinary commercial trade |
| Tariff relief without a port-fee extension | Part of the gain absorbed by higher ocean-freight costs on grain, meat and other farm exports after Nov. 10 |
| Renewed purchase pledges and working groups only | Competitive disadvantage remains; commitments still rest on government-directed buying |
Table 2. How the possible tariff outcomes of the Xi visit compare. Source: Author analysis.
Likely Non-Tariff Deliverables
Greer’s reference to non-tariff barriers probably covers several unresolved commitments.
Beef facility eligibility: China recently extended registrations for 425 U.S. beef facilities and approved 77 additional facilities. The summit could produce a timetable for restoring shipments from suspended plants, resuming imports from 17 states and preventing registrations from being allowed to lapse again.
Poultry regionalization: China previously agreed to reopen trade from individual states after they regain highly pathogenic avian influenza-free status. Beijing has been slow to act, leaving poultry from numerous disease-free states ineligible. A firm automatic-relisting timetable would provide meaningful new access.
Corn and wheat tariff-rate quotas: China’s opaque administration of its corn, wheat and rice quotas continues to restrict imports, particularly by private companies. More transparent allocations and timely redistribution of unused state-trading quotas would be necessary for China to make sizable purchases of U.S. corn and wheat.
Biotechnology approvals: China has not fully implemented commitments for transparent, predictable reviews of new biotech traits. Faster approvals and workable rules for low-level presence would reduce the risk that grain cargoes are delayed or rejected.
Pork and beef residue standards: USTR continues to press China to complete its long-promised risk assessment for ractopamine and to publish and apply science-based residue limits consistently.
Food and facility registration: China’s registration system for foreign food facilities remains cumbersome and vulnerable to political intervention. Streamlining that process would benefit meat, dairy, processed-food and specialty-crop exporters.
| Non-tariff issue | Where it stands | What a summit deliverable would look like |
| Beef facility eligibility | 425 registrations extended; 77 facilities added; some plants and 17 states still shut out | Timetable to restore suspended plants and states; no more lapsed registrations |
| Poultry regionalization | Relisting of HPAI-free states has been slow | Firm automatic-relisting timetable |
| Corn, wheat and rice TRQs | Opaque administration limits private-company imports | Transparent allocations; timely redistribution of unused state quotas |
| Biotech approvals | Commitments on predictable reviews not fully implemented | Faster approvals; workable low-level-presence rules |
| Pork and beef residue standards | Ractopamine risk assessment still incomplete | Published, consistently applied science-based limits |
| Food and facility registration | Cumbersome, vulnerable to political intervention | Streamlined process for meat, dairy, processed and specialty exporters |
Table 3. Non-tariff barriers on the table for the Xi visit. Sources: USTR; author analysis.
U.S./China Port Fee Truce Faces Nov. 10 Deadline
No extension has been announced, but the issue is likely to be included in the September Trump/Xi discussions. An extension appears more likely than an abrupt reinstatement because renewed fees would raise ocean freight costs for U.S. grain, meat and other agricultural exports while increasing import costs for fertilizer, chemicals and machinery. However, the administration still views the fees as leverage against China’s dominance of global shipbuilding. A meaningful summit package would logically extend the port fee suspension alongside any reduction in the two countries’ 10% agricultural tariffs; otherwise, higher shipping costs could offset part of the competitiveness gained from tariff relief.
Analysis & Perspective
Tariff removal would have a much greater immediate market effect than another headline purchase number. The United States already has Chinese commitments covering 25 million metric tons of soybeans annually and at least $17 billion of other farm products, but those targets are difficult to fulfill while U.S. commodities remain structurally more expensive than Brazilian and other competing supplies.
Soybeans would receive the clearest and fastest benefit because China’s crushers can shift origins quickly.
Sorghum and cotton also could gain because neither faces the same quota constraint as corn and wheat.
Corn and wheat sales would require both tariff relief and changes to China’s quota administration.
Beef and poultry would benefit mainly from reliable facility approvals and science-based animal-disease rules.
Across all of these, bulk grain and sorghum cargoes moving in Chinese-built or Chinese-operated tonnage would feel reinstated port fees most directly, which is why a port-fee extension belongs in the same package as tariff relief.
| Commodity | Tariff relief | Quota reform | Facility / SPS action | Speed of likely gain |
| Soybeans | Yes | No | No | Fastest — crushers can switch origins quickly |
| Sorghum | Yes | No | No | Fast — no TRQ constraint |
| Cotton | Yes | No | No | Fast — no TRQ constraint |
| Corn | Yes | Yes | Biotech approvals help | Slower — needs both tariff and quota changes |
| Wheat | Yes | Yes | No | Slower — needs both tariff and quota changes |
| Beef | Helpful | No | Yes — facility approvals | Depends on plant and state relistings |
| Poultry | Helpful | No | Yes — HPAI regionalization | Depends on automatic relisting |
Table 4. What each U.S. commodity needs from the summit to gain in China. Source: Author analysis.
The benchmark for the Xi visit should therefore be straightforward: Do the two sides eliminate the remaining 10% tariffs, does China open its market to ordinary commercial buyers, and is the port-fee suspension extended so that higher freight costs do not claw back the gain? If they do, the agreement could redirect substantial Chinese demand from Brazil and other suppliers toward the United States. If the summit produces only renewed purchase promises and administrative working groups, the underlying competitive disadvantage will remain—and China’s agricultural commitments will continue to depend heavily on state-directed buying rather than normal trade.
AG POLICY & MARKETS DAILY | SPECIAL REPORT | U.S.-CHINA TRADE — SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2026



