Trump/Milei Soybean Pact Aims to Reshape Global Market Power
Behind the “stabilization” language lies an apparent coordinated U.S./Argentina strategy to manage volatility, counter China’s leverage, and protect farm-sector economics
The Nov. 13, 2025, Trump/Milei Framework for a U.S./Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment (link) includes unusually explicit language committing both governments to “work toward stabilizing the global soybean trade.”
While broad on the surface, this clause carries concrete implications for how the world’s No. 2 and No. 3 soybean exporters intend to cooperate on market behavior, supply-chain rules, and political strategy in the years ahead.
Below is an in-depth look at what the agreement likely means in practice, and who stands to benefit most. It is based on talks with government officials and soybean industry contacts. The Trump administration has not released much additional information regarding this topic. Also, at the end of this dispatch, note the comments from two contacts who know the industry well. Their responses are the best bottom line for this topic.
What the Soybean Clause Likely Means in Operational Terms
1. Coordinating Export Pacing to Avoid Price Whiplash
The U.S. and Argentina often flood the same markets at the same time, destabilizing futures prices and crushing crush margins for processors and livestock producers. The new framework gives both governments a diplomatic channel to time export surges, especially during early-harvest windows.
Practical example:
• Argentina frequently front-loads soymeal exports during the Southern Hemisphere harvest. Consultation with the U.S. could reduce simultaneous dumping of beans, meal, or oil into Europe, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia.
Outcome: Reduced volatility in Chicago futures, steadier revenue for U.S. farmers, and more predictable meal prices for global buyers.
2. Joint Diplomatic Pressure on Tariffs, SPS Barriers, and Regulatory “Surprises”
Both countries routinely face arbitrary or politically motivated restrictions from China, India, the EU, and others.
Practical example:
• Coordinated U.S./Argentina demands that China speed up biotech-trait approvals, instead of holding up shipments over unapproved GMO varieties.
• Joint pressure on the EU to loosen or phase-in deforestation-rule compliance schedules that threaten both exporters.
Outcome: Faster port clearances, fewer shipment rejections, and smoother month-to-month global trade flows.
3. Limiting China’s Ability to Play Exporters Against Each Other
China buys 60%+ of all soybeans traded globally and routinely uses timing, auction windows, and “phantom cancellations” to extract price concessions.
Under the Trump/Milei framework, the U.S. and Argentina can now share buying-pattern intelligence and coordinate messaging when Beijing attempts to whipsaw the market.
Practical example:
• If China pauses U.S. purchases to pressure prices lower, Argentina would not immediately counter-flood the market (and vice versa).
Outcome: China loses some leverage, exporters gain bargaining power, and price crashes become less frequent.
4. Regulatory Harmonization: Biotech Approvals and Digital Certificates
Port delays and regulatory misalignment cost exporters millions each year.
Practical example:
• A U.S./Argentina pilot project on digital sanitary certificates could reduce customs bottlenecks in key markets.
• Aligning approval timelines for next-gen biotech traits would reduce the risk of rejected cargos.
Outcome: Faster shipments, fewer compliance headaches, and improved reliability for major importers.
5. Crush-Capacity Coordination: Avoiding a Meal-Market Price Collapse
Argentina dominates soymeal exports; the U.S. dominates whole-bean shipments. If both expand crush capacity too aggressively at the same time, global meal markets can collapse.
Practical example:
• Argentina consults with the U.S. before adding major new crush capacity (e.g., 7–10 MMT).
• The U.S., in turn, could time whole-bean export windows to avoid oversupply during Argentina’s crush peaks.
Outcome: More orderly meal and oil markets, better returns for crushers, and steadier demand for U.S. whole beans.
6. Stabilizing Markets During Droughts, Floods, or Export Bans
Argentina is highly vulnerable to La Niña–driven droughts; the U.S. faces its own weather-related variability. Sudden export bans or taxes can panic global markets.
Practical example:
• During a severe Argentine drought, both governments coordinate messaging and policy steps — avoiding abrupt export taxes or bans that send futures markets into chaos.
Outcome: Calmer markets and more predictable price discovery.
Who Benefits Most from the Trump/Milei Soybean Alignment?
1. U.S. Farmers and Midwestern Ag Processors
• Stabilized futures markets reduce violent month-to-month price swings.
• Greater leverage with China — especially during high-stakes tariff diplomacy.
• Reduced risk of being undercut by sudden Argentine meal surges.
2. Argentina’s Crushing Industry (Rosario hub)
• Better protection from meal-price collapses.
• Increased partnership with the U.S. could attract foreign investment in crushing, logistics, and port upgrades.
• Coordination with Washington boosts Argentina’s credibility in global markets.
3. Global Importers (China, EU, Southeast Asia)
• More predictable shipping schedules.
• Reduced regulatory delays due to harmonized biotech approvals and digital certificates.
• Lower risk of sudden Argentine export taxes or U.S. tariff shocks.
4. The Trump Administration
• Farm-state political credit for reducing volatility in soy markets during tariff upheavals.
• A new strategic lever over China without calling it “market management.”
• A diplomatic partnership with Milei that boosts U.S. influence in South America.
5. President Milei and Argentina
• Gains geopolitical alignment with Washington.
• Improved access to investment in critical minerals (the other half of the agreement).
• A chance to reset Argentina’s image as a reliable, rules-based exporter rather than an unpredictable one.
Bottom Line:The Trump/Milei soybean clause is far more than symbolic language.
It establishes a bilateral architecture for coordinated export behavior, regulatory harmonization, diplomatic pressure on major importers, and joint market-stabilization strategies across the entire soy complex: beans, meal, oil, logistics, biotech, and crush capacity. If fully implemented, the U.S./Argentina soybean alignment would mark the first time since the early 2000s that two top-tier exporters have sought to actively shape global market dynamics, rather than simply compete within them.
But one contact asked: The big question is what about Brazil? They are the wild card… how do they and how do the Chinese respond?”
An industry contact responded via email: “I think there could be meaningful cooperation and coordination on numbers 2,4,and 6 that would be beneficial. Personally, I’m skeptical on the others as natural competitive forces are at play. Moreover they largely depend on or involve the private trade which neither government controls (thankfully).”
